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When it comes to the regulation of non-profits in a European context, 
some explanation is always required. First, what do we mean by European? 
Is it meant as a shorthand term for the individual approaches of the various 
Member States, all 28 of which comprise the European Union? Or, does it 
refer more specifically to the institutional confederated approach of the EU, 
acting through the auspices of the European Commission or expressing its 
views through the European Council or Parliament? Adopting the first ap-
proach leads to a kaleidoscope of events and developments as each Mem-
ber State, as we shall see, retains sovereignty to regulate charities in 
accordance with its own national laws and policies. The fact that European 
countries operate under either a common law or civil law legal system adds 
another layer of complexity to the regulatory scene and results in Member 
States lacking a common regulatory language and culture when it comes to 
promulgating non-profit laws. Even within single Member States, there can 
be additional wrinkles when discussion turns to the enforcement of charity 
law. In the United Kingdom alone, one finds three different pieces of chari-
ty legislation, creating three different charity regulators; each jurisdiction 
with its own nuanced way of applying the law.1
If, instead, one chooses to descend down the rabbit hole of the “Euro-
pean regulation of non-profits,” an equally murky world emerges. The Eu-
ropean Union draws its competency from those areas of law, which under 
its treaties Member States have ceded to or shared with it. In those areas in 
1. England and Wales act under the Charities Act 2011 with the Charity Commission for Eng-
land and Wales; Scotland boasts the Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator (OSCR), which operates 
under the Charities and Trustees’ Investment Act (Scotland) 2005, while in Northern Ireland the princi-
pal agency is the Charity Commission for Northern Ireland (CCNI) which operates under the Charities 
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which it has exclusive competence, only the EU can act.2 Examples of such 
areas would include monetary policy for the Member States whose curren-
cy is the euro, and matters relating to the customs union.3 In areas in which 
competence is shared between the EU and Member States, such as the in-
ternal market, agriculture and fisheries and development cooperation and 
humanitarian aid, Member States can act only if the EU has chosen not to.4
In other words, EU action in a given field has the capacity to crowd out 
individual Member State competence to act.
Remaining areas falling outside these categories can be further divided 
in two, namely: areas in which the EU has competence to support, coordi-
nate or supplement actions of the Member States5 and areas in which the 
EU has competence to provide arrangements within which EU Member 
States must coordinate policy.6 In the case of the former, covering matters 
ranging from culture, tourism, industry, civil protection and the promotion 
of health, the EU may not adopt legally binding acts that require the Mem-
ber States to harmonize their laws and regulations. In the latter instance, 
Member State coordination is required in the areas of economic and social 
policy and employment.
When it comes to the European regulation of non-profits, the Europe-
an Commission faces many of the same pressures and constraints experi-
enced at a national level. It suffers, however, from an additional 
disadvantage in that, arguably, it lacks jurisdictional competence to regu-
late non-profits qua non-profits. One might compare this situation, not 
unfairly, to one of federal-state competency: while a federal legislator may 
have a better overview of the broader regulatory issue and perhaps a macro 
solution to hand, in the absence of state relinquishment of sovereignty (or, 
at least, a willingness amongst states to coordinate their individual ap-
proaches along federal lines), the federal regulator will be powerless to 
intervene. The European Commission has experienced the harsh reality of 
this situation in its recent bruising and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to 
secure the passage of the proposal for a European Foundation Statute 
(“EFS”). Although the requirement for Member State unanimity and the 
European Council’s inability to deliver this level of consensus scuppered 
2. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 3, Mar. 30, 
2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 53 [hereinafter TFEU] (text available at 
http://europa.eu/pol/pdf/qc3209190enc_002.pdf#page=52). 
3. THE EU CUSTOMS UNION: PROTECTING PEOPLE AND FACILITATING TRADE, EUROPEAN 
COMM’N (Nov. 2014), http://europa.eu/pol/pdf/flipbook/en/customs_en.pdf.
4. TFEU, supra note 2, art. 4.
5. Id. art. 6.
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the Commission’s proposal, failure to pass the proposed regulation has not 
relieved the Commission of the problems it identified as giving rise to the 
need for the EFS in the first instance.
Part I reviews the rationale for the EFS proposal, the political con-
cerns that left it vulnerable to veto and highlights the structural challenges 
faced by the Commission when it comes to legislating for non-profits at a 
European level. The argument is advanced that extant a purely functional 
approach, European regulation of non-profits from “the inside out” is diffi-
cult in the absence of a valid treaty basis.
Switching from a European Commission besieged in its non-profit 
regulatory attempts by legislative limitations and lack of Member State 
buy-in, we turn to another regulator whose non-profit oversight has become 
a subject of increasing scrutiny. Since the events of 9/11, the Financial 
Action Task Force (“FATF”) has concerned itself not just with the devel-
opment of anti-money laundering measures but also with counter terrorist 
financing regulation. This latter responsibility led it to introduce non-profit 
oriented recommendations and best practice principles to prevent the ex-
ploitation of vulnerable non-profits. The national rollout of these intended 
protective measures has led some governments to over-regulate nonprofits 
in the name of security. Accepting criticisms that despite the noble inten-
tions behind the FATF’s non-profit recommendations, their widespread 
application to charities had been disproportionally negative, the FATF em-
barked upon a review of its guidance on non-profit vulnerability.
Part II examines NGO attempts to influence the FATF reform process 
and efforts, supported by the European Commission, to extract a fairer 
process for dealing with NGOs under FATF Recommendation 8. The 
Commission’s role in assisting NGOs to bring pressure on the FATF to be 
more accountable and transparent in its dealings with the sector presents an 
interesting vignette of one regulator laying siege to another in the greater 
good of better non-profit oversight. The Commission’s involvement in 
“regulating from the outside in” has arguably strengthened NGO relations 
and resulted in the Commission demanding a higher level of transparency 
of the FATF than it itself has been willing to provide to NGOs in the past.
Apart from the obvious connections with development cooperation 
and humanitarian aid, in which competence is shared, the more general 
regulation of the broader church of non-profit organizations falls into the 
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Member States to harmonize their laws and regulations but must rather 
work to support actions of the Member States. Indeed, one has to search the 
treaties carefully to find mere mention of non-profit organizations and their 
treatment under European law. The founding Treaty of Rome expressly 
excluded non-profit bodies from the fundamental freedom of establish-
ment.7 This is perhaps not surprising when one considers that the Treaty of 
Rome dealt with the establishment of the European Economic Community, 
the emphasis clearly placed on for-profit rather than non-profit activity. 
The 2001 Nice Treaty8 amended Article 257 of the TEC to make reference 
in the treaties for the very first time to “civil society,” including in the 
membership of the European Economic and Social Committee “parties 
representative of civil society.”9 Nice left the scope and extent of civil so-
ciety, however, entirely undefined. NGOs quickly sought to build upon this 
treaty reference, calling for the introduction of a further treaty article to 
give a legal basis to structured civil dialogue and legitimate the various 
initiatives taken by the Commission to instigate a civil dialogue.10
Nine years later, Article 11 of the Treaty of Lisbon went one step fur-
ther by providing for “an open, transparent and regular dialogue with repre-
sentative associations and civil society” and the European institutions.11
Moreover, Article 15 of the TFEU (Article 255 of the TEC) now declares 
that “in order to promote good governance and ensure the participation of 
civil society, the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies shall 
conduct their work as openly as possible,” leaving open the possibility for 
stakeholders such as NGOs to be both better informed and more influential 
in the European institutional decision-making process than in previous eras.  
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) in recent 
years has also further strengthened the rights of NGOs within European 
law. Case law now firmly establishes that the right of free movement of 
7. Id. art. 54 (ex art. 48 TEC) (“Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a 
Member State and having their registered office, central administration or principal place of business 
within the Union shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, be treated in the same way as natural persons 
who are nationals of Member States. ‘Companies or firms’ means companies or firms constituted under 
civil or commercial law, including cooperative societies, and other legal persons governed by public or 
private law, save for those which are non-profit-making.”) (emphasis added).
8. The Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the 
European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Feb. 1, 2003, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 44. The treaty was 
signed by European leaders on February 26, 2001, but came into force on February 1, 2003. 
9. TFEU, supra note 2, art. 300.
10. See PLATFORM OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL NGOS, DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE AND EUROPEAN 
NGOS: BUILDING A STRONGER STRUCTURED CIVIL DIALOGUE 2–3, 6 (2001), 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/contributions/social-ngos_en.pdf.
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capital applies to non-profit organizations.12 Equally, in the area of tax law 
the application of the “non-discrimination principle” has forced (sometimes 
reluctant) Member States to treat comparable “foreign” charities (meaning 
charities which are established elsewhere in the EU but operate within the 
borders of the Member State) equivalently to domestically established char-
ities when it comes to tax exemption or relief,13 thereby facilitating the 
growth of cross-border philanthropy.
And yet, it remains the case that the want of an appropriate treaty ba-
sis makes it difficult to regulate or legislate for non-profit organizations at a 
European level. Without such a treaty basis, the EU institutionally is often 
powerless to act and must instead rely either on the individual responses of 
its Member States or proceed by way of soft law alternatives. On occasions 
when the European Commission has sought to introduce enabling or over-
sight legislation for non-profits, the only treaty lifeline open to it has been 
Article 352 of the TFEU.
The exercise of Article 352, while providing the Commission with the 
required legislative basis, comes at a high price. It provides that if action by 
the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies 
defined in the treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the treaties, 
and the treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the Council, act-
ing unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining 
the consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate 
measures. Unanimity amongst 28 Member States is, at best, difficult to 
achieve. Failure to reach the necessary consensus can and does result in 
entire proposals, regardless of their merit or support within the non-profit 
sector, falling by the wayside. Attempts to adopt the EFS on the basis of 
Article 352 have proved, if anything, to be a sobering experience for all 
involved without the wished-for happy ending.
In February 2012, the European Commission published its Proposal 
for a Council Regulation for a European Foundation Statute which, if 
adopted, would provide a new and optional European legal structure for 
12. See Case C-386/04, Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer v. Finanzamt München für 
Körperschaften, 2006 E.C.R. I-8203.
13. See Case C- -00359, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-318/07 (follow “Curia” link under “Judg-
ment”); Case C-25/10, Missionswerk Werner Heukelbach eV v. Belgium, 2011 E.C.R. I-00497, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-25/10 (same); Case C-39/04, Laboratoires 
Fournier SA v. Direction des vérifications nationales et internationals, 2005 E.C.R. I-2068; Case C-
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certain public benefit organizations.14 The road to this proposal was long, 
stretching well back to European Commission public consultations in 2006 
on Future Priorities for the Action Plan on Company Law and Corporate 
Governance,15 in which an impressive rate of 55% of the respondents to the 
consultation unanimously endorsed the Commission’s proposal for a feasi-
bility study on the need for a European Foundations Statute.16 The securing 
of Commission support for a feasibility study, subsequently published in 
2009,17 was the result of an impressive feat of non-profit lobbying in an 
environment that up to that time had not proved amenable to non-profit 
regulatory proposals.18 This “one step forward” for European non-profit 
regulation was accompanied by the proverbial “two steps back” for, in the 
same year as the publication of the Future Priorities Report, the Commis-
sion withdrew its proposals for Regulations on the Statute for a European 
Association (“ESA”)19 and the statute for a European Mutual Society,20
introduced in 1991, on the overarching grounds that they “were found not 
to be consistent with the Lisbon and Better Regulation criteria, unlikely to 
make further progress in the legislative process or found to be no longer 
topical for objective reasons.”21
A. Rationale for Proposal 
According to proponents of the EFS proposal, European enabling leg-
islation was essential not only for the future growth of cross-border philan-
thropy in Europe but to remove existing obstacles which denied 
foundations the benefits of a common market enjoyed by their for-profit 
counterparts. With an estimated 110,000 foundations in operation with 
14. See generally EUROPEAN COMM’N, PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL REGULATION ON THE 
STATUTE FOR A EUROPEAN FOUNDATION (FE) (2012).
15. See DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR INTERNAL MKT. & SERVS., CONSULTATION AND HEARING ON 
FUTURE PRIORITIES FOR THE ACTION PLAN ON MODERNISING COMPANY LAW AND ENHANCING 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, SUMMARY REPORT (2006), 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/consultation/final_report_en.pdf [hereinafter FUTURE
PRIORITIES REPORT].
16. Id. at 26.
17. UNIV. OF HEIDELBERG, CTR. FOR SOC. INV. & MAX PLANCK INST. FOR COMPARATIVE AND 
INT’L PRIVATE LAW, FEASIBILITY STUDY ON A EUROPEAN FOUNDATION STATUTE – FINAL REPORT
(2009),
http://efc.issuelab.org/resource/feasibility_study_on_a_european_foundation_statute_final_report?_ga=
1.151023292.448896650.1389109535 [hereinafter FEASIBILITY STUDY].
18. See Oonagh B. Breen, EU Regulation of Charitable Organizations: The Politics of Legally 
Enabling Civil Society, INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 50, 51 (2008).
19. Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Association,
COM (1991) 273 final (Mar. 6, 1992) OJ C 99/1. 
20. 1992 O.J. (C 99/40).
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assets in excess of €1,000 billion in Europe alone, the feasibility study 
found that over 67% of these bodies were engaged in international activity, 
giving rise to a further growth in cross-border activity.22 Foundations oper-
ating in more than one jurisdiction encountered additional costs (and often 
difficulties) in establishing, registering and operating outside their home 
territory. According to the study, the estimated costs of these legal barriers 
amounted to between €101 million and €178 million per annum.23
An enabling statute that would provide a common European vehicle 
instantly recognized and accepted in all EU Member States and subject to a 
common supervisory regime administered at a national level was thus an 
appealing proposition to the European foundation sector. The promulgation 
of the EFS by European regulation would ensure a European standard 
throughout all Member States, creating for the first time an agreed defini-
tion of what constituted a public benefit entity for the purposes of cross-
border philanthropy. However, the effect of such a definition would go 
much further than merely removing national barriers to establishment but 
would also set the parameters for both European supervision and enforce-
ment of European foundation law on the one hand, and the awarding of 
national tax exemption on the other.
The feasibility study considered five different models to overcome the 
legal barriers to cross-border national foundation activity within the EU.  
Of the five considered, the authors recommended as their preference “the 
European Foundation Model with additional tax exemption” on the grounds 
that:
24
This proposal formed the basis of the European Commission’s ill-
fated 2012 proposal. Between the release of the feasibility study in 2009 
and the publication of the Commission’s proposal in 2012, supporters of 
22. FEASIBILITY STUDY, supra note 17, at 149.
23. Id. at 178.
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the EFS rallied together, explaining to the wider public as well as European 
institutional bodies why an EFS was needed to enable trans-European phil-
anthropic efforts to reach their potential.25
B. Political Concerns and the Veto Block 
The Commission’s 2012 proposal for the EFS was, at the very least, 
an ambitious one. Two issues of particular concern gave rise to Member 
State disquiet, namely the proposed definition of public benefit and the 
provision for automatic and universal tax exemption for European Founda-
tions (“FEs”). A third difficulty that arguably weakened Member State 
consensus on the proposed EFS related, ironically, to the very nature of the 
definition of “foundation” employed in the Commission’s proposal. Pro-
tracted negotiations on these issues weakened the momentum towards 
promulgation and while these were not the only sticking points encountered 
by the Commission in its attempt to guide the proposal through the Europe-
an Council, it is arguable that these three matters are symptomatic of the 
greater difficulties experienced in the EU when thoughts turn to European 
non-profit regulation.
C. Defining Public Benefit – Pleasing Some of the People None of the 
Time 
Among the most provocative features of the Commission’s proposed 
regulation was the inclusion of a lowest common denominator definition of 
“public benefit purpose” setting the parameters for what constituted a Eu-
ropean notion of philanthropy, at least for cross border purposes. Part of the 
challenge in this regard proved to be the difficulty of accommodating the 
divergent concepts of common law and civil law philanthropy within the 
one European regulatory definition. The common law approaches the con-
cept of “charity” through the interpretational lenses of “charitable purpose”
and “public benefit.” Both of these terms have, over the centuries, been the 
subject of judicial interpretation and more lately statutory (re)definition, 
resulting in common law countries such as the United Kingdom and Ireland 
enjoying a rich, if somewhat complex, toolkit for deciding whether an or-
ganization qualifies as charitable or not. Core to this charity test is the dual
25. Gerry Salole, Why is the European Foundation Statute Needed?, INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L.
75, 75–84 (2008); EUROPEAN FOUND. CTR., IT’S TIME FOR A EUROPEAN FOUNDATION STATUTE (2011);
ALLIANCE PUBLISHING TRUST, PHILANTHROPY IN EUROPE: A RICH PAST, A PROMISING FUTURE (Nori-
ne MacDonald & Luc Tayart de Borms eds., 2008); Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on 
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aspect of a list of defined charitable purposes and a requirement of suffi-
cient benefit to the public. In contrast, civil law jurisdictions do not share 
the common law concept of “charity” and the judicial traditions of these 
jurisdictions are not dependent upon case law in the development of the 
law as in Ireland and England. Given that the driving forces behind the EFS 
were foundations based in civil law jurisdictions, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that the proposed definition of a “public benefit purpose” fitted a civil law 
perspective of the term. To this end, Article 5 of the EFS provided that a 
public benefit purpose included:
(a) arts, culture or historical preservation;
(b) environmental protection;
(c) civil or human rights;
(d) elimination of discrimination based on gender, race, ethnicity, re-
ligion, disability, sexual orientation or any other legally prescribed 
form of discrimination;
(e) social welfare, including prevention or relief of poverty;
(f) humanitarian or disaster relief;
(g) development aid and development cooperation;
(h) assistance to refugees or immigrants;
(i) protection of, and support for, children, youth or elderly;
(j) assistance to, or protection of, people with disabilities;
(k) protection of animals;
(l) science, research and innovation;
(m) education and training;
(n) European and international understanding;
(o) health, well-being and medical care;
(p) consumer protection;
(q) assistance to, or protection of vulnerable and disadvantaged per-
sons;
(r) amateur sports;
(s) infrastructure support for public benefit purpose organizations.
This definition, however, was not co-extensive with the common law 
definition of “charitable purpose.” It omitted, for instance, the advancement 
of religion entirely; and the notion of being “exclusively” for charitable 
purposes—an integral part of the common law test—was also absent from 
early European drafts. Moreover, the use of the descriptor “public benefit 
purpose” caused confusion for common law countries, devoid as it was of 
the common law understanding of the essential tests for public benefit. The 
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be open to wide interpretation and could give rise to inconsistent applica-
tions under the national laws of different countries. Finding compromise 
that could accommodate both the secular approach of certain civil law ju-
risdictions and the common law canons of interpretation regarding the pa-
rameters of philanthropy proved to be extremely difficult.
D. Taxing Questions – Competence, Sovereignty and Definition 
Another arresting and ultimately troubling feature of the proposed 
EFS was the provision for universal tax-exempt status of FEs by virtue of 
their establishment so that “in all cases, [tax exemption] treatment should 
be applied without any need for the FE or its donors or beneficiaries to 
prove that the FE is equivalent to domestic public benefit purpose entities.”
In other words, existence as an FE per se would be sufficient for it to be 
considered as an equivalent tax-exempt domestic charity, no further nation-
al inquiry being entertained. The EFS reversed the burden of proof that up 
until this time had lain with the foreign charity to prove its tax equivalent 
status to the tax authority of the host Member State. The automatic ac-
ceptance of tax legitimacy by virtue of the FE label proved to be extremely 
controversial amongst Member States with the fear being that a host tax 
authority would be forced to grant tax relief to an FE registered in another 
Member State but active in the host country without having the ability to 
scrutinize the latter’s purposes in the same way as it would scrutinize a 
domestic charity applying under national law.
Tax law is an area in which the EU does not have competence to make 
legally binding decisions that require Member State harmonization. The 
Commission’s approach initially, at least, was that the EFS tax provisions 
did not amount to tax harmonization but were rather an application of the 
non-discrimination principles. However, the Member States’ strong at-
tachment to the notion of national tax sovereignty coupled with discord 
over the definitional scope of public benefit purpose entities led to a num-
ber of Member States vetoing these provisions.
The European Council began its scrutiny of the EFS proposal in April 
2012, under the tenure of Danish Government. Although the issue re-
mained on the agenda of the next three European Council Presidencies,26
not even a subsequent compromise version of the tax provisions garnered 
26. Cyprus took over the Presidency of the European Council from Denmark on July 1, 2012 and 
was followed six months later by Ireland and then Lithuania. Lithuania handed over the EFS portfolio 
to the Greek Presidency in January 2014 before finally the Italian Presidency dropped the EFS from its 
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unanimous agreement, leading to the Lithuanian Presidency ultimately 
dropping the tax provisions from the proposal in November 2013.27
E. ‘Foundation’ – What’s in a Name? 
A third challenge which came to light during the legislative scrutiny 
process was the fact that the regulation focused on only one type of legal 
vehicle—the foundation. While at first glance, this may not have seemed 
problematic and indeed might have been viewed as a natural extension 
from previous Commission proposals which had dealt respectively with the 
creation of the European public companies28 (successfully) and the Euro-
pean Association29 (unsuccessfully), the type of foundation envisaged by 
the EFS was very much a civil law concept. Given the number of active 
European foundations, the vast majority of support for the EFS came from 
continental Europe and the representative body for European foundations, 
the European Foundation Centre.30
The difficulty, however, was that in common law countries the foun-
dation was less a legal concept and more a descriptive label. Typically, 
charitable companies (namely, companies limited by guarantee) and chari-
table trusts were the legal vehicles of choice in common law countries 
when it came to cross-border philanthropy. Both of these legal forms, how-
ever, fell outside the scope of the EFS proposal. Article 2 of the EFS pro-
posal defined a “public benefit purpose entity” as: “
31
Although the company limited by guarantee met the condition of in-
corporation, it had members whereas a trust, while not having members, 
was unincorporated, placing both entities outside the functional definition 
of an FE.
27. The tax provisions contained in the proposal for a European Foundation Statute (EFS) were 
officially withdrawn, following a meeting of COREPER—the group of EU Member States’ political 
representatives—on November 8, 2013 in the aftermath of the presentation of the Lithuanian compro-
mise text.
28. Council Regulation 2157/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 94) (EC) (Council regulation of 8 October 2001 
on the Statute for a European company (SE)).  
29. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Statute for a 
European Association, COD (1991) 0386, subsequently withdrawn by the Commission, Communica-
tion from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Outcome of the Screening of 
Legislative Proposals Pending before the Legislator, COM (2005) 462 final.
30. See EUROPEAN FOUND. CTR., http://www.efc.be (last visited Sept. 18, 2015).
31. Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Foundation,





      06/09/2016   10:30:17
38015-ckt_91-3 Sheet No. 88 Side B      06/09/2016   10:30:17
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
For common law countries, therefore, the attractiveness of the EFS 
proposal was more limited and it did not enjoy the groundswell of support 
from the charity sector that might otherwise have prompted these Member 
State governments to work harder at the proposal’s adoption.32 This lack of 
fulsome support can be seen from the rather negative response of the Brit-
ish Minister for Employment Relations and Consumer Affairs to the Com-
mission’s Consultation on Future Priorities in 2006 querying whether the 
UK considered it a useful exercise to carry out the then proposed EFS fea-
sibility study33:
The UK’s continued insistence on the EFS proposal’s irrelevance is 
further evidenced by more recent 2015 correspondence between the Chair-
man of the House of Lords EU Justice Sub-Committee and Rob Wilson 
MP, Minister for Civil Society at the Cabinet Office, noting that the sub-
committee was “pleased to see the Commission withdrawing proposals 
where there is no realistic prospect of agreement in the Council” before 
formally clearing the proposal from parliamentary scrutiny.34
F. Structural Challenges and Lessons 
One of the challenges of a co-decision legislative process, to which 
the EFS proposal was subject, is getting all necessary parties on board 
within an acceptable time frame. While proponents of the EFS proposal 
managed to secure European parliamentary support35 and support of the 
regional and social committees,36 European Council approval proved to be 
beyond their reach. The legal requirement for Member State unanimity 
32. Attorney Gen., N. Ir., Colloquium on European Developments in Charity Law, Belfast (Feb. 
28, 2014).
33. See Select Committee on European Union Fortieth Report, HOUSE OF LORDS (Mar. 28, 2006), 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldeucom/187/187232.htm.
34. See Letter from David Lidington MP, Minister of Europe, Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, to the Chairman (July 1, 2015), http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-sub-
com-e/cwm/CwMsubE31Mar-10Jul15.pdf.
35. See generally European Parliament Resolution of 2 July 2013 on the Proposal for a Council 
Regulation on the Statute for a European Foundation (FE), EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 0035-2012/0022) 
(2013).
36. See Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on “The Statute for a European Foundation,”
2013 O.J. (C 17/13); Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the “Proposal for a 
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certainly hampered this process and while, undoubtedly, those who sup-
ported the EFS did well to keep the issue alive over the course of five suc-
cessive Council presidencies, ultimately lack of sufficient progress on the 
proposal tarnished its appeal for incoming Council presidents, who in their 
short reign of six months aspire to leave behind a list of their own legisla-
tive achievements, rather than spend precious time negotiating around past 
presidencies’ albatrosses. From a political perspective, therefore, unless the 
next presidency shares your passion on the importance of advancing a leg-
islative proposal or can reinvent your idea to make it their own, there is 
little chance, in the absence of Member State consensus, of a proposal re-
maining on the agenda.
And yet, many of the problems that the EFS proposal set out to tackle 
still remain. Cross border philanthropy does not fully enjoy the benefits of 
the common market. Establishment and legal regulatory costs make it more 
difficult for a charity to operate across jurisdictions in a tax-effective man-
ner.37 Matters are improving, thanks to ECJ jurisprudence and Commission 
enforcement notices, but there is still some way to go. There was no appe-
tite amongst Member State governments to invest the required resources in 
the setting up of registration and supervision processes for the proposed 
FE.
Until the EU works out at a macro level how best to support interstate 
philanthropy and charitable giving and until it resolves at a European 
Council level what purposes and activities fall within an agreed inclusive 
European definition of public benefit entities, full regulatory enablement of 
the sector will not be achieved. And this has consequences for regulation.  
For effective regulation is only truly possible when the area to be regulated 
is mapped and the ground rules are set as to who is covered and in what 
situations. In the absence of a legal basis that requires less than unanimity, 
it will remain extremely difficult for the Commission to create a European 
non-profit enabling space within which to create a non-profit regulatory 
framework that has buy-in across the EU.
37. TRANSNATIONAL GIVING EUR., EUROPEAN FOUND. CTR., TAXATION OF CROSS-BORDER 
PHILANTHROPY IN EUROPE AFTER PERSCHE AND STAUFFER: FROM LANDLOCK TO FREE MOVEMENT?
44 (2014) (noting that “[t]he landmark judgements (sic) of the European Court of Justice force Member 
States not to discriminate [against] foreign EU-based public benefit organisations and their donors. 
However, this study reveals that barriers continue to exist. Several Member States have not yet removed 
discrimination and even where they have, problems remain. [Public Benefit Organisations] and their 
donors encounter a lack of legal clarity, long and complicated procedures, and significant additional 
translation and consultancy costs to show their comparable status. Within the EU no formal or uniform 
approach to the comparability test is foreseen: Usually it is the competent tax authority who decides on 
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A. The Regulatory Context 
Following the events of 9/11, the world and its institutions turned their 
attention to the task of curtailing and preventing the funding of terrorism. 
The non-profit sector was seen as particularly vulnerable to abuse by terror-
ist factions who might wish to launder money through innocent charities or 
to set up bogus charities as fronts for terrorist activity and funding. For its 
part, the UN Security Council issued Special Resolution 1373 in 2001,
which obliged all States to criminalize assistance for terrorist activities, to 
deny financial support and safe haven to terrorists, and to share information 
about groups planning terrorist attacks.38
Further effect was given to this goal by the FATF39 passing in 2001 of 
nine Special Recommendations aimed at countering terrorist financing. The 
FATF was founded in 1989, comprising of 34 Member States, two regional 
councils,40 eight regional associate members and a host of observer bod-
ies.41 The FATF is an intergovernmental body charged with setting stand-
ards to promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and 
operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing 
and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial sys-
tem.42 Special Recommendation VIII (“SR VIII”)43 focused on the vulner-
abilities of the non-profit sector and tasked FATF Member States with 
38. S.C. Res. 1373, 4 (Sept. 28, 2001). Resolution 1373 was followed in 2013 by UN Security 
Council Special Resolution 2129, which further recognized “the need for Member States to prevent the 
abuse of non governmental, non-profit and charitable organizations by and for terrorists, and call[ed] 
upon non-governmental, non-profit, and charitable organizations to prevent and oppose, as appropriate, 
attempts by terrorists to abuse their status, while recalling the importance of fully respecting the rights 
to freedom of expression and association of individuals in civil society and freedom of religion or 
belief, and noting the relevant recommendation and guidance documents of the Financial Action Task 
Force.” S.C. Res. 2129 (Dec. 17, 2013).
39. Described by Ben Hayes, civil society legal analyst, as “the most powerful agency you never 
heard of”. KAY GUINANE, CIVICUS, GUEST ESSAY, THE INTERNATIONAL ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING 
SYSTEM’S NEGATIVE EFFECT ON CIVIL SOCIETY RESOURCES, STATE OF CIVIL SOCIETY REPORT 251
(2015).
40. Namely, the European Commission and the Gulf Cooperation Council.
41. Including, inter alia, the UN, the World Bank and Interpol. For a full list of all members, 
associates and observers see FATF Members and Observers, FATF, http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/about/membersandobservers/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
42. See About, FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
43. FATF, FATF IX SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS (2001), http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF Standards - IX Special Recommendations and IN rc.pdf
[hereinafter SR VIII]. In February, 2012, the FATF revised the 40 and the IX Recommendations. The 
FATF integrated its nine special recommendations on the financing of terrorism into its 40 Recommen-
dations. See Press Release, FATF, FATF Recommendation (2012), http://www.fatf-
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ensuring that their charity regulatory frameworks were robust enough to 
withstand terrorist manipulation of their non-profit entities.44
The effect of SR VIII was to require all Member States to undertake 
greater scrutiny and supervision of non-profit activity. In support of this 
end, the FATF published a non-binding Best Practices Paper (“BPP”) in 
2002 and a binding Interpretative Note on SR VIII in 2006, the purpose of 
the latter being to define what constituted a non-profit organization and 
what exactly SR VIII required. The FATF’s standards, comprising of 40
standards on anti-money laundering measures and the nine standards coun-
tering terrorism funding, now represent an “essential element of the global 
‘good governance’ agenda promoted by the United Nations, European Un-
ion, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and regional devel-
opment banks.”46
B. Greater Protection or Simply Excessive Regulation? 
Attempts by many governments to give effect to SR VIII have resulted 
(sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly) in the imposition of restrictive 
laws that have reduced the enabling civic space in which non-profit organi-
zations traditionally operate. In their 2012 Report, Legalising Surveillance, 
Regulating Civil Society, StateWatch and the Transnational Institute exam-
ined the actions of 159 FATF Member States to give effect to SR VIII.47 In 
the words of the report’s preface, “the study shows that SR VIII has created 
a system of onerous rules and regulations that have great potential to sub-
ject NPOs to excessive state regulation and surveillance, which restricts 
44. The wording of SR VIII provides: 
Countries should review the adequacy of laws and regulations that relate to entities that can 
be abused for the financing of terrorism. Non-profit organisations are particularly vulnera-
ble, and countries should ensure that they cannot be misused:
(i) by terrorist organisations posing as legitimate entities;
(ii) to exploit legitimate entities as conduits for terrorist financing, including for the purpose 
of escaping asset freezing measures; and
(iii) to conceal or obscure the clandestine diversion of funds intended for legitimate purpos-
es to terrorist organisations.
SR VIII, supra note 43.
FATF, BEST PRACTICES: COMBATING THE ABUSE OF NON-PROFIT ORGANISATIONS 
(RECOMMENDATION 8) (2015), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/BPP-combating-
abuse-non-profit-organisations.pdf [hereinafter BPP].
46. STATEWATCH & HUMAN SECURITY COLLECTIVE, COUNTERING TERRORISM OR 
CONSTRAINING CIVIL SOCIETY? THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS 
ON NON-PROFIT ORGANISATIONS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA 4 (2015).
47. BEN HAYES, TRANSNATIONAL INST./STATEWATCH, COUNTER-TERRORISM, ‘POLICY 
LAUNDERING’ AND THE FATF: LEGALISING SURVEILLANCE, REGULATING CIVIL SOCIETY (2012), 
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their activities and thus the operational and political space of civil society 
organizations.”48
The Legalising Surveillance Report found that an unintended effect of 
SR VIII’s evaluation system was to endorse some of the most restrictive 
non-profit regulatory regimes in the world, while simultaneously providing 
strong encouragement to some already repressive governments to introduce 
new rules likely to restrict the political space in which NGOs and civil 
society actors operate.49 The report’s findings in this regard have been fur-
ther corroborated by independent academic studies, reports published by 
ICNL and Civicus50 and interestingly, other global institutions.51 The 
World Bank, for instance, has questioned the suitability of SR VIII, noting 
that:
in and of itself
52
In a wide-ranging and well-referenced work, Douglas Rutzen further 
evidenced the adverse consequences of government regulation in this area, 
identifying ten common regulatory practices introduced by governments 
that have the direct or indirect effect of constraining the operating space for 
civil society organizations.53 Six of these measures arise in the context of 
efforts at FATF compliance and include:
(1) requiring prior government approval to receive international fund-
ing;
(2) capping the amount of international funding that a CSO is allowed 
to receive;
(3) requiring that international funding be routed through govern-
ment-controlled entities;
48. Id. at 7.
49. Id. at 10.
50. See Douglas Rutzen, Aid Barriers and the Rise of Philanthropic Protectionism, 17 INT’L J.
NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. 5 (2015); GUINANE, supra note 39.
51. See, e.g., Maina Kiai (Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and 
of association), Rep. submitted in accordance with Human Rights Council Resolution 24/5, 35, U.N. 
Doc. A/69/365 (Sept. 1, 2014) noting “the battle against crime and terrorism has been used by some 
States as a cover for imposing politically motivated restrictions on civil society funding. The Special 
Rapporteur thus remains concerned about the risk of over-regulation that FATF recommendations 
introduce (see A/HRC/23/39).”
52. Emile Van der Does de Willebois, Non-profit Organizations and the Combating of Terrorism 
Financing a Proportionate Response 33 (World Bank Working Paper No. 208, 2010),
http://issuu.com/world.bank.publications/docs/9780821385470
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(4) prohibiting CSOs from receiving international funding from spe-
cific donors;
(5) constraining international funding through the overly broad appli-
cation of counterterrorism and anti-money laundering measures; 
and
(6) imposing onerous reporting requirements on the receipt of interna-
tional funding.
The practical effects of such measures are again highlighted in the re-
cent Civicus State of Civil Society Report for 2015. In her guest essay in 
that report, the Director of the non-profit Charity and Security Network, 
Kay Guinane, referred to a number of legislative changes introduced by 
countries as a result of their FATF evaluations, all of which result in exces-
sive regulation of CSO funding.54 These include:
Spain’s passing of a new law requiring all NGO donations 
over €1000 to be reported to the national government;55
Uzbekistan’s insistence that NGOs get approval for foreign 
grants and report each financial transaction using these funds 
to the Ministry of Finance on the next business day, no matter 
how small the individual transaction;56
India’s requirement that all CSOs receiving foreign contribu-
tions must report them to the central government within thirty 
days of receipt;57
In response to its FATF evaluation, the British Virgin Islands 
passed a law requiring CSOs with more than five employees 
to appoint a Money Laundering Reporting Officer. Those with 
less than five staff need not appoint a separate officer but are 
still required to perform the Money Laundering Reporting Of-
ficer functions. Stiff fines are imposed for the failure to main-
tain any records required to be maintained.58
54. GUINANE, supra note 39.
55. See Spanish Royal Decree (B.O.E. 2014, 304), passing the Regulation of Act 10/2010 on 
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing, which completes the implementation into 
Spanish law of Directive 2005/60/EC. 
56. See NGO Global Monitor: Uzbekistan, INT’L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW,
http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/uzbekistan.html (last updated  July 25, 2015).
57. Indian Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010, No. 42, Acts of Parliament, 2010 (India); 
See India, COUNCIL OF FOUNDS. (last modified Oct. 2015), http://www.cof.org/content/india.
58. See FIN. SERVS. COMM’N, VIRGIN ISLANDS, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST 
FINANCING CODE OF PRACTICE, 2008 (2008), http://www.bvifsc.vg/Portals/2/Anti-
Money%20Laundering%20and%20Terrorist%20Financing%20Code%20of%20Practice,%202008.pdf 
(consolidated by The Financial Services Commission on February 17, 2009). Fines range from $3000 to 
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More recently, in a further indictment of the FATF’s exercise of its 
regulatory role, the Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Coun-
tering Terrorism chided the FATF for missing opportunities to highlight 
when national legislative efforts to comply with SR VIII were at variance 
with international human rights law. In the words of Special Rapporteur 
Ben Emerson, “in its peer review processes, the Task Force has rarely criti-
cized overregulation and lack of respect for human rights, focusing instead 
on cases of insufficient regulation.”59
C. FATF Evaluation – Understanding the Process 
The peer review process mentioned by Special Rapporteur Emerson 
occurs in the context of the FATF mutual evaluation process. Unpacking 
how this process works is a useful exercise in better understanding the driv-
ing forces that have contributed to the introduction of the types of regulato-
ry measures, referred to by Guinane and Rutzen above,60 and the 
consequent foreclosing of civil society space.
Member State compliance with the FATF’s recommendations is moni-
tored in a two-step process. Each member carries out an initial self-
assessment of compliance, which is followed up by a peer-to-peer mutual 
evaluation process and report. Based on the level of country compliance 
with the key FATF recommendations, reports, prepared by a team of finan-
cial, legal and law enforcement experts from other countries, rate countries 
as being somewhere on the scale between “compliant,” “largely compli-
ant,” “partially compliant” or “non-compliant.” The final reports are made 
publicly available and indicate the necessary steps required to be taken by a 
country if its compliance with the FATF recommendations falls short.61
The time between Mutual Evaluation Reports depends on the health of a 
LIST OF OVERREGULATION OF NGOS: FOR DISCUSSION AT ICNL’S GLOBAL FORUM 2015 (2015),
http://www.icnl.org/globalforum2015/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Illustrative-List-of-Overregulation-
of-NGOs.pdf.
59. Ben Emmerson (Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism), Rep. submitted in accordance with Assembly resolu-
tion 68/178 and Human Rights Council resolutions 15/15, 19/19, 22/8, and 25/7, 36, U.N. Doc.  
A/70/371 (Sept. 18, 2015).
60. See supra note 50.
61. FATF Mutual Evaluation Reports can be accessed online at Topic: Mutual Evaluations,
FATF, 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/?hf=10&b=0&s=desc%28fatf_releasedate%29 
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country’s assessment, with more frequent re-evaluations occurring of less 
compliant countries.62
When it comes to compliance rates with SR VIII (now “R8”), the Le-
galising Surveillance Report’s 2012 review of the Mutual Evaluation Re-
ports of 159 countries found that63:
The low levels of compliance and the need for better engagement be-
tween the regulators and the regulated was further emphasized in the 2013 
report prepared by the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation 
(“CGCC”), following a two-year project led by the United Nations and 
aimed at developing a common understanding of sound practices to counter 
the risk of terrorism financing through the non-profit sector.64 The project 
included two global-level meetings and five regional-level expert meetings. 
More than 50 states and 80 NPOs participated in the meetings, in addition 
to representatives of relevant UN and multilateral agencies, officials from 
the FATF and FATF-style regional bodies (“FSRBs”), and the financial 
sector.65 One of the key findings of the CGCC report was the need for the 
62. Thus by way of example, Australia’s 3rd Mutual Evaluation Report in 2005 concluded that the 
country was compliant with 12 Recommendations; largely compliant with 14; partially compliant with 
13; and non-compliant with 10. Rated as compliant or largely compliant with 13 of the 16 Core and Key 
Recommendations, Australia was placed under the regular follow-up process immediately after the 
adoption of this report. However, due to the lack of progress, it was placed under the enhanced follow-
up process in February 2012, a process it exited in June 2014, having achieved a satisfactory level of 
compliance with all Core and Key Recommendations. See FATF, MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT
AUSTRALIA (2015). 
63. LEGALISING SURVEILLANCE REPORT, supra note 47.
64. GLOB. CTR. ON COOPERATIVE SEC., TO PROTECT AND PREVENT: OUTCOMES OF A GLOBAL 
DIALOGUE TO COUNTER TERRORIST ABUSE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, § v (2013) (noting that “Un-
derstanding and awareness about the risk of terrorism financing in the non-profit sector is uneven 
globally, and levels of compliance with Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendation 8 are 
low. Yet, there is consensus on the key elements of an effective response, including the need for a risk-
based approach that identifies and mitigates the risk of terrorism financing, proportionality, outreach to 
the sector, and engagement on a whole-of-government basis across relevant government agencies.”). 
65. Launched at an initial expert working-group meeting held in London in January 2011, the 
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active participation of the non-profit sector to help build relationships of 
trust and confidence in emerging regulatory frameworks66 and it is to the 
actualization of this finding that the next section now turns, first by consid-
ering briefly the EU Commission’s past efforts to comply with R8 before 
turning to the latest efforts of civil society to refashion the FATF non-profit 
relationship of engagement.
D. The European Union Response 
“Since non-profit organisations frequently have an international pro-
file, it is necessary to find international solutions, notably at EU level, as a 
complement to domestic measures.”67 As a regional FATF member in its 
own right, the European Commission itself has experienced difficulties in 
the past in giving full effect to R8. Its first efforts in 2005 took the form of 
a Commission Communication (from DG Justice), recommending, inter 
alia, a Framework for a Code of Conduct to enhance transparency and ac-
countability of NPOs and to reduce the risk of abuse of the non-profit sec-
tor.68 The Communication made recommendations to EU Member States as 
well as to NPOs, to “verify the identity and good faith of their beneficiar-
ies, donors and associate NPOs,” and “keep full and accurate audit trails of 
funds transferred outside their jurisdiction.” The code request was prompt-
ed both by R8 and by European Council declarations following the 2005 
London bombings.69 Although conceding that “the Framework for a Code 
of Conduct should not in any way hinder legal cross border activities of 
NPOs,” and declaring that “the aim of the European approach is thus to 
establish common principles on which national implementation can be 
based,”70 the Commission provided no guidance on how these common
principles were to be achieved and following non-profit concerns, the code 
was never implemented.
2011), Nairobi (March 2012), Buenos Aires (November 2012) and Doha (January 2013), respectively.  
The aims of the initiative were to bring together experts from Member States, the non-profit sector and 
relevant international and regional organizations to discuss the risk of terrorism financing abuse in a 
regional context, to foster cooperation in that regard, and to promote the sharing of good practices.
66. See supra note 64.
67. Council of the European Union, Counter Terrorism Coordinator, Revised Strategy on Terror-
ist Financing No. 11778/1/08 REV 1 of 17 July 2008, 8. 
68. Commission of the European Communities, The Prevention of and Fight Against Terrorist 
Financing through Enhanced National Level Coordination and Greater Transparency of the Non-Profit 
Sector, COM (2005) 620 final (Nov. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Commission Communication (2005) 620 
final].
69. Council Declaration C/05/187 of 13 July 2005, following the London bombings, had already 
asked the EU to “agree a Code of Conduct to prevent misuses of charities by terrorists.” (available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_PRES-05-187_en.pdf).
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Nonetheless, in its 2009 Communication on the draft Stockholm Pro-
gramme, the Commission focused on the need at European level to regulate 
non-profits:
71
The Stockholm Programme set out a five-year framework for the EU 
in the area of justice and home affairs. Negotiated by the European Coun-
cil, the final version, published in 2010, mandated the Commission “to 
promote increased transparency and responsibility for charitable organisa-
tions with a view to ensuring compatibility with Special Recommendation 
(SR) VIII of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).”72 Part of the diffi-
culty for the Commission, as we have already seen in the context of the 
EFS, is the expectation that it will act in an area in which it lacks a legal 
basis for European non-profit regulation per se. Thus, finding the mecha-
nism through which to give satisfactory expression to the goals of R8 has 
proven somewhat challenging.
Realizing perhaps its legislative limitations, the Commission sought to 
develop and introduce voluntary anti-terrorist financing guidelines for EU-
based non-profit organizations to achieve R8 regulatory compliance. The 
substantive principles to this effect, outlined in a Commission Discussion 
Paper of 201073 that largely reflected the Commission’s earlier 2005 Com-
munication proposals,74 found little favor, however, with non-profit re-
spondents.
The Commission’s desire to limit consultation on the 2010 Discussion 
Paper to a select group of invited non-profits and Member State representa-
tives did little to endear it to the broader non-profit community who were 
neither given access to the Discussion Paper nor invited to comment upon 
it.75 Public disclosure of the matters under discussion and dissemination of 
civil society’s perspective occurred only to the extent that invited non-
71. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: An Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice serving the Citizen, at 23, COM (2009) 262 final (June 10, 2009).
72. Council of the European Union, The Stockholm Programme – An Open and Secure Europe 
Serving and Protecting Citizens, 2010 O.J. (C 115).
73. See European Commission, Discussion Paper on Voluntary Guidelines for EU Based Non-
profit Organisations (July 2, 2010).
74. Commission Communication (2005) 620 final, supra note 68.
75. For a full account of the content of the Discussion Paper and the background to civil society-
EU relations at the time, see Through the Looking Glass: European Perspectives on 
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profits were prepared to publish their responses (along with copies of the 
Discussion Paper). In one such published response, the European Centre 
for Not-for-Profit Law (“ECNL”) sought to clarify the role of the Commis-
sion in relation to the non-profit sector and the context for the Discussion 
Paper.76 Citing the purpose of the guidelines as being “to encourage NPOs 
to review their internal rules, to increase awareness about potential terror-
ism abuse and thus reduce the risk of NPOs’ possible abuse for terrorist 
financing purposes,”77 ECNL advanced the view that achievement of this 
goal could only occur if the Commission dropped its prescriptive tone as a 
regulator and became instead an enabler of civil society. ECNL urged the 
Commission to act as a convener to bring Member States and their best 
practices together to be shared precisely because of the lack of specific 
regulation at EU level that could otherwise serve as a reference point for 
the guidelines.78
To date, despite promises of further and wider consultation on the 
matter, the Commission’s voluntary guidelines, intended for release in 
2011,79 have yet to be published in their final form. The webpage of the 
Commission’s Directorate General for Home Affairs however still states 
that, “Voluntary guidelines for the sector could be a means to enhance 
transparency and accountability of NGOs and to reduce their potential 
abuse for terrorist financing. The Commission aims to closely involve the 
NGO sector and EU States in its work in this field.”80
E. To the Barricades: Reclaiming the Concept of Civic Space 
The first formal engagement on a bilateral basis between the FATF 
and interested non-profits on the reform of R8 took place on April 24, 2013 
when the FATF hosted a consultation and dialogue meeting with non-profit 
organizations in London. That engagement, which followed a 2012 com-
mitment by the Norwegian FATF presidency to enter in dialogue with non-
profits regarding the implementation of R8,81 may well itself have been 
76. ECNL, COMMENTS ON THE DISCUSSION PAPER ‘VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES FOR EU BASED
NON-PROFIT ORGANISATIONS’ (2010).
77. Id. at 3.
78. Id. at 4.
79. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Delivering an area of 
freedom, security and justice for Europe’s citizens: Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Pro-
gramme, at 40, COM (2010) 171 final (Apr. 20, 2010). 
80. See Financing, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/crisis-and-terrorism/financing/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 15).
81. See Bjorn S. Aamo, Pres., FATF, Address at the 40th Plenary Meeting of the Committee Of 
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prompted by the ongoing multilateral successes of the CGCC project,82 in
which both the FATF and non-profits participated. This renewed prioritiza-
tion of sector engagement was certainly welcomed with interest by all par-
ticipants in the CGCC project in their final multi-lateral meeting in New 
York in March 2013.83
A positive outcome of the April 2013 London bilateral meeting was 
the adoption by the FATF of a limited update of the International Best 
Practices Paper: Combating the Abuse of Non-Profit Organisations,84
which included a highlighting of the message that measures to protect 
NPOs from misuse should not disrupt or discourage legitimate charitable 
activities. In his letter to NPO participants in June 2013 informing them of 
progress made subsequent to the April meeting, the FATF President, Bjorn 
Aamo, expressly acknowledged the contribution of the NPO representa-
tives to the process and welcomed their input into the preparation of the 
planned NPO Typologies Paper.85
The involvement of non-profits in this latter process was well coordi-
nated, pitched at a high-level, and produced strong working papers and 
substantive suggestions. A number of NGO coalitions developed around 
these issues at both a European regional level and a transnational interna-
tional level, resulting in the formation of a Non-profit Platform on the 
FATF. Funded by the Open Society Foundation and co-facilitated by 
ECNL in Budapest, the European Foundation Centre (“EFC”) in Brussels, 
the Human Security Collective (“HSC”) in The Hague and the Charity & 
Security Network (“CSN”) in Washington, D.C., the coalition sought to 
give voice and structure to non-profit contributions.86 To this end, a self-
eyval), Development of the Global Network and other key elements of FATF work under the Norwe-
gian Presidency (Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/developmentoftheglobalnetworkandotherkeyelementsoffatf
workunderthenorwegianpresidency.html.
82. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
83. Ctr. On Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, Preventing Terrorist Abuse of the Non-Profit 
Sector: Summary Observations (Working Document, Final Expert Working Group Meeting on Prevent-
ing Terrorist Financing Abuse of the Non-profit Sector in New York Mar. 5-7, 2013),
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/briefings/2013/npo/docs/working-document-4-5feb.pdf.
84. BPP, supra note 45 (first published in 2002, subsequently revised in 2013 and 2015).
85. Letter from FATF on Best Practices Paper on Recommendation 8 to All NPO Participants of 
the FATF Consultation and Dialogue Meeting with Non-Profit Organisations (June 25, 2013) (noting 
“it is without a doubt that the work of the FATF on this paper has benefitted extensively from the April 
2013 Consultation meeting and the written comments that we received from the NPO sector after the 
Consultation meeting. . . I once again thank you for your constructive cooperation over the past year on 
this important update.”).
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styled Transnational NPO Working Group on FATF submitted recommen-
dations to the FATF on the proposed Typology Review in February 2014.87
The key recommendations made were that the typologies should be 
evidence based; they should distinguish between potential risk (i.e., vulner-
ability) and actual abuse; they should recognize the diverse structures and 
functions of NPOs and avoid an overbroad definition of terrorist financing;
and they should recognize risk mitigation procedures employed by the 
NPO sector.88 The FATF provided the Transnational NPO Working Group 
with an opportunity to respond to the draft report in June 2014.
Published in June 2014, the Risk of Terrorist Abuse in Non-profit Or-
ganisations Report sought to examine in detail how and where NPOs were 
at risk of terrorist abuse.89 Using case studies as well as input collected 
from law enforcement, other government actors and non-profits them-
selves, the report was intended to increase awareness of the methods and 
risk of abuse for terrorism of the non-profit sector, both domestically and 
internationally and to serve as a basis for a more comprehensive revision of 
the Best Practices Paper on Combating the Abuse of Non-Profit Organisa-
tions (Recommendation 8).90 The final report included several of the rec-
ommendations advanced by the Transnational NPO Group, most 
particularly reference to: a) the positive role played by civil society in in-
creasing human security worldwide; and b) the special protections the sec-
tor has under international human rights law and international humanitarian 
law.91 Outstanding issues not adequately addressed by the Typologies Re-
port, however, remained in the form of concerns of the frequent conflation 
of vulnerability and risk of abuse in the substance of the report.92
F. NPO Restructuring of the Regulatory Space: The Revised BPP 
2015 
Building on the momentum created by this engagement over the past 
twelve months, non-profit coalitions have engaged both directly and proac-
tively with the FATF in the revisions of the Best Practices Paper on Com-
bating the Abuse of Non-Profit Organisations (“BPP”), but also indirectly 
87. See TRANSNATIONAL NPO WORKING GROUP ON FATF, RECOMMENDATIONS: FINANCIAL 
ACTION TASK FORCE TYPOLOGY REVIEW (Feb. 2014), http://fatfplatform.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/NPO-Sector-Typology-Position-Paper-FATF.pdf.
88. Id.
89. FATF, RISK OF TERRORIST ABUSE IN NON-PROFIT ORGANISATIONS (2014). 
90. BPP, supra note 45.
91. Letter from the Transnational NPO Working Group to Co-Chairs of the RTM Working Group 
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through the channels of the EU Commission and U.S. Treasury to bring 
pressure on the FATF to be more transparent in its dealings and delibera-
tions. The value of these inputs can be seen in the documents released by 
some of these collectives, which document the iterative process that pre-
ceded and influenced the revised BPP, published in June 2015.93 The de-
tailed nature and high quality of these initial non-profit recommendations 
gave weight to the coalition’s call for “continuous formal consultation be-
tween the NPO sector and FATF, including participation in the Private 
Sector Consultative Forum.”94
In their initial recommendations to the FATF, the Transnational NPO 
Working Group proposed a number of reforms to the 2013 BPP to adopt a 
targeted approach towards the implementation of R8 rather than a one-size-
fits-all approach and calling for proportionality in risk mitigation measures.
The draft Best Practices Paper on Combating the Abuse of Non-Profit Or-
ganisations, released by the FATF in March 2015, took account of these 
particular concerns, giving effect to them specifically in paragraphs 7a, b 
and e (dealing with targeted approaches), paragraph 21 (dealing with pro-
portionality), a new section V (dealing with access to financial services) 
and the separate creation of an annex of examples of good NPO practices 
with the express admonition that such examples were not to be treated as a
formal checklist of required practices, much to the satisfaction of the NPO 
Working Group.95
Much less to the satisfaction of the Working Group, however, was the 
consultation process undertaken by the FATF in relation to the March 2015 
draft. The draft paper was released on a strictly confidential basis only to 
the invitees of the FATF Consultation and Dialogue Meeting with NPOs 
held in Brussels on March 25, 2015. The draft BPP expressly stated that it 
93. See, e.g., Lia van Broekhoven, Initial NPO Input into FATF Revision of the R8 ‘Best Practic-
es Paper’, CHARITY & SEC. NETWORK (2014), 
http://www.charityandsecurity.org/sites/default/files/files/2014%20dec%2018%20Core%20Group%20s
ubmission%20to%20the%20BPP%20review(1).pdf) (noting that the sharing of these non-profit rec-
ommendations with the FATF Secretariat arose from the latter’s invitation and in light of preceding 
discussions between non-profit coalitions and FATF officials in Paris in October 2014).
94. Id. The Private Sector Consultative Forum plays an important role in fostering effective 
implementation of the FATF Recommendations by bringing together representatives of sectors that are 
subject to AML/CFT requirements (the financial sector and other designated businesses and profes-
sions), civil society, and policy makers to discuss issues of common interest. See, e.g., Dialogue with 
the Private Sector, FATF, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/news/private-sector-forum-march-
2015.html (last visited Nov. 3, 15).
95. See FATF, Draft Best Practices Paper on Combating the Abuse of Non-Profit Organisations 
(Recommendation 8) 20 (Working Draft, FATF Consultation and Dialogue Meeting with Non-Profit 
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was “not for further distribution to any persons outside or within your or-
ganisations.”96 As noted by the Working Group’s April 2015 response to 
the draft BPP:
97
It is interesting to note the reference here to the inclusive role of the 
European Commission in this process, which was a far cry from the Com-
mission’s aforementioned poor consultative record in respect of its own 
Discussion Paper on Voluntary Guidelines in 2010.98 It remains an open 
question as to whether this commendably facilitative approach—which 
borders on the convener role earlier urged upon the Commission by 
ECNL—will become the norm for all future Commission direct engage-
ment with NPOs or whether such an approach is only likely to be adopted 
when the Commission is a participant (as opposed to lead negotiator) in a 
related FATF consultation.
G. Non-profit Gains in FATF Regulatory Space: The Return of the 
Jedi? 
Reflecting for a moment on the outcomes of recent FATF engagement 
with the non-profit sector in its review of R8 compliance practices, one 
might query whether FATF oversight was under siege from the sector and 
wonder to the extent that it might have been, what victories, if any, did the 
non-profit insurgents secure for their efforts. Perhaps one of the most tan-
gible outcomes has been the FATF’s announcement that in the future it will 
hold an annual formal consultation with non-profit organizations on specif-
ic issues of common interest and that it will organize ad hoc exchanges on 
technical matters.99 The announcement was made at the FATF’s plenary 
meeting in Brisbane in June 2015, the same meeting that saw the publica-
tion of the revised BPP.
96. Id. at 2.
97. FATF, Joint NPO Comments on FATF Draft Best Practices Paper on Combating the Abuse 
of Non-Profit Organisations (Recommendation 8) 2 (Working Draft as of Mar. 2015, Apr. 24, 2015).
98. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
99. Outcomes of the Plenary Meeting of the FATF, Brisbane, 24-26 June 2015, FATF, 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/outcomes-plenary-june2015.html (last 
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Arguably, the direct engagement of the non-profit coalition on both 
the revisions of the BPP and the preparation of the Typologies Paper has 
given the FATF a far greater appreciation of the sector’s capacity to con-
tribute to R8 reform in an effective manner, leading to the promise of more 
formal future ongoing engagement. With the recent conclusion in Novem-
ber 2015 of an FATF public consultation on a proposed revision of the 
Interpretive Note to R8 to take account of the new Typologies Report and 
revised BPP,100 the opportunity to give effect to this promise awaits to be 
fulfilled. Non-profits have responded to the FATF’s call for feedback;101
the extent to which the FATF will take these views on board in its revised 
note remains to be seen.102
One interesting feature of the FATF non-profit engagement has been 
the willingness of nonprofits to engage in their own regulation—nonprofits 
have not been averse to regulation but have sought good regulation that 
respects the principles of freedom of association and assembly and that is 
proportionate in application and enforcement. The sector’s challenging of 
the broad statements of the FATF regarding the vulnerability of the entire 
NPO sector and development of NPO typology has the rationalizing effect 
of drawing to the regulator’s attention the fact that if a sham/complicit or-
ganization is more correctly defined as a non-NPO, then imposition of 
greater regulation on NPOs in general will not solve the problem at hand, 
as such non-NPOs will not be caught.
Similarly, NPO awareness of the political implications of confusing 
concepts of “risk” and “vulnerability” and the potential adverse impact of 
document lists that become viewed as checklists or isolated case studies 
that become accepted as the norm for the sector without any empirical evi-
dence of their prevalence is extremely refreshing. It challenges the regula-
tor to a) become more accountable and transparent; b) to distinguish 
between useful illustrative examples and policy statements; and c) to en-
gage in better crafted drafting so that FATF terms are clear and precise and 
100. See Public Consultation on the Revision of the Interpretive Note to Recommendation 8 (Non-
profit Organisations), FATF (Nov. 6, 2015), 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/public-consultation-npo-
inr8.html in which the FATF especially welcomed the views of the NPO sector “in order to ensure that 
practical knowledge and experience, in particular from service NPOs, can be properly reflected in the 
Interpretive Note to Recommendation 8.”
101. See GLOBAL NPO COALITION ON FATF, COMMENTS ON THE FATF ON THE OPEN, PUBLIC 
COMMENT PROCESS, SEEKING INPUT FROM NPOS ON REVISION OF THE INTERPRETIVE NOTE (IN) FOR 
RECOMMENDATION 8 (2015), 
http://fatfplatform.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/GlobalCoalitionCommentsINRevision.pdf.
102. The FATF will meet in February 2016 to review consultation feedback received before 
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set out clearly when action is not required as much as when it is. Admitted-
ly, non-profits have not won this latter battle yet.
A win-win for the FATF that comes out of this non-profit engagement 
must be the realization of the regulatory gains that can be made when a 
regulator’s oversight is under siege. One area in which this is particularly 
relevant is the current discussions over R8 and the issue of de-risking. De-
risking refers to the phenomenon of financial institutions terminating or 
restricting business relationships with clients or categories of clients to 
avoid, rather than manage, risk in line with the FATF’s risk-based ap-
proach. In the words of the FATF,
103
This is a particular concern for certain non-profits either because of 
the conflict areas in which they work—e.g., Somalia or Syria, or because of 
the nature of the charity—e.g., Islamic charities, in particular.104 These 
charities have found themselves victims in a banking system that has 
sought to close their accounts as the easiest way to ensure compliance with 
the CFT standards of bodies such as the FATF. The latest report from the 
Overseas Development Institute highlights the dangers of over-regulation 
in this regard:
105
The 2015 revision of the BPP guidance on “Access of NPOs to Finan-
cial Services” was informed by NGO insights and evidence of the practical 
103. FATF Clarifies Risk-based Approach: Case-by-case, Not Wholesale De-risking, FATF (Oct. 
23 2014), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/news/rba-and-de-risking.html. 
104. See, for instance, Mark Tran, Somalis Fear Barclays Closure of Remittance Accounts Will 
Cut Lifeline, GUARDIAN (June 24 2013), www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2013/jun/24/somalis-barclays-remittance.
105. Victoria Metcalfe-Hough et al., UK Humanitarian Aid in the Age of Counterterrorism: Per-
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effects of banks’ de-risking.106 The wording of the BPP to the effect that 
“financial institutions should not view NPOs (as that term is defined by 
FATF) as high risk simply because they may operate in cash-intensive 
environments or in countries of great humanitarian need”107 coupled with 
BPP advice to banks when assessing the potential risk of an NPO to take 
into account:
108
is very much driven by non-profit dialogue and experience in this re-
gard.
The extent to which future successes are possible will only become 
apparent over time as the next round of Mutual Evaluation Reports are 
carried out. To this end, a watching brief must be kept on the compliance 
rates of Member States with R8 balanced against the introduction of new 
proscriptive national regulations ostensibly warranted by FATF but ad-
versely affecting non-profit activity. If the advice of UN Special Rappor-
teur Emerson is heeded, evaluators will need clear guidance to aid their 
interpretation of R8 and the courage to identify and call out instances of 
Member State wrongful reliance on FATF principles to curtail civic space 
rather than to protect against the threat of terrorist financing.
The capacity for bespoke European regulation of non-profit organiza-
tions remains, at least to this author’s mind, a distant and remote prospect.  
European regulation is not, nor should it be, impossible when approached 
on a functional basis. Thus, where the prescription (or indeed, proscription) 
relates to the structure, operations or substantive activity in which the EU 
has competence to regulate (be it competition law, labor law, workers’ 
rights etc.) the fact that such regulation affects non-profit as well as for-
profit actors will be a matter of little importance. It is when the focus of the
106. Further evidence of the dangers of derisking for the non-profit sector can be seen in TOM
KEATINGE, DEMOS UNCHARITABLE BEHAVIOUR (2014),
http://www.demos.co.uk/files/DEMOSuncharitablebehaviourREPORT.pdf?1419986873.
107. BPP, supra note 45, at [68].
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regulation is upon the activities of non-profits qua non-profits, as we have 
seen, that difficulties in terms of European competence (in the narrow 
sense) and European consensus (in the broader European Member State 
context) will arise.
This article has sought to shed light on some of the underlying factors 
that inform these regulatory misadventures. The lack of an available legal 
treaty basis forcing non-profit regulation into the straitjacket of Council 
unanimity is not aided by the traditional cultural and legal divergences that 
exist within a community of 28 Member States. Even when these cultural 
differences can be overcome, the regulatory areas of most interest frequent-
ly border on those areas most sensitive to Member State sovereign control 
(e.g., tax policy) or seek to impose new regulatory regimes in areas in 
which many Member States have yet to work out their own robust regimes 
(e.g., the effective regulation of charities). The six-month rotation of the 
presidency of the European Council results in the existence of a short-term 
policy window such that only those legislative proposals for which there is 
the greatest collective need or priority will remain on the policy and legis-
lative agenda. To end here would thus give credence to the view that Euro-
pean regulation of non-profits is simply an empty promise.
And yet, the facilitative role of the European Commission in the re-
cent non-profit drive to reform FATF regulation of non-profit activities 
does open up a glimmer of opportunity. It raises the potential for the Com-
mission to use its capacity as a convener of Member States, coupled with 
its broad understanding of potential non-profit vulnerability to terrorist 
financing in the cross border philanthropy arena, to raise NGO governance 
standards while simultaneously reducing the potential for over-zealous 
FATF over-regulation. It is too early to tell whether this quixotic chimera 
can be attained or whether we are simply tilting at windmills in our quest 
for a European regulator.
